The greener grass

When dissecting the parlous state of modern British politics I tend to fall down on the side of those who say 'if only there were greater differences between the parties - people would have something to get excited about'. While its true that there are certain long term social trends that have lowered levels of political participation (the loosening of class-based loyalties, the weakening of locally rooted political sub-cultures, the rise of consumerism, the decline of collectivism), I still believe that a more competitive and polarised political spectrum would bring more people to the polls. Lower rates of participation are of course affected by long-term cultural trends that are difficult to reverse - but the Italian and French experiences show that when post-industrial European electorates are given a real choice they can still be mobilised to vote.

Of course its a tricky one - Labour was right to move to the centre ground, to change its message, to secure the votes of affluent voters who had previously thought us too left-field to manage the economy. We had to do it to end eighteen miserable years of Thatcherite rule. Nevertheless, the price our politics has paid - particularly now the Tories have had the electoral sense to move to the centre as well - is that, despite their different instincts and values (which I contend, contray to Peter Oborne's ludicrous new book, are very different), in policy terms there is far too little choice before the voters. No wonder people think 'they're all the same' - I don't think they are - but they are forced to pretend to be the same (which is something different that Oborne doesn't seem to understand).

Anyhow - its regrettable and our politics is much less interesting as a consequence. So I look with some awe on the spectacle that is unfolding on the other side of the Atlantic, where politics does seem very interesting.

It has not always been thus - when I was a kid I remember someone on TV trying to explain the difference between Republicans and Democrats thus: 'Well, the Republicans are the American version of our conservative party, while the Democrats are ...erm...the American version of our conservative party'.

How different things look today.

In his new book Ronald Brownstein argues that American politics has never been so polarised between two opposing blocs - divided by partisan identification, geography, demography (notably race, income and religion) and basic political values. This is the America of almost equally balanced red states and blue states that we have seen come to the fore in the last two presidential elections. This is the America of two parties fundamentally divided on a number of key issues: health care (universal insurance versus personal responsibility), energy (oil and gas versus renewables), foreign policy (the Bush doctrine versus multilateralism), and of course basic moral questions (same sex partnerships, abortion, stem cell research).

Compare this to what Brownstein describes as the period of bargaining in American politics - in which the parties were as divided internally as they were different from one another, in which congressmen and women would readily cross the floor to do deals with their partisan opponents. Essentially in the 1950s and 60s America had a four party system - the Southern Democrats (despising the party of Lincoln but opposing civil rights for African Americans), the conservative republicans of Barry Goldwater, the Northern urban Republicans who bought into the New Deal and backed civil rights, and the liberal Democrats. Politics was done by forging messy coalitions - most successfully as it turned out by that arch congressional deal maker Lyndon Johnson.

So what changed? Brownstein identifies a number of macro-political factors: changes in the rules within congress that gave more powers of patronage and discipline to the Speaker and Majority Leaders and led to greater party discipline (essentially the Republicans voting in more consistently conservative ways and the Democrats in more consistently liberal ways), the rise of more powerful and organised liberal and conservative interest groups in Washington with the power to punish representatives voting with the other side, and (the most fundamental factor) 'the great sorting out' of the electorate into two ideological camps, as the allegiances of the Civil War ceased to be relevant. Hence the Southern white democrats became Republicans and the liberal urban Republicans became Democrats. Liberals voted for a liberal party and conservatives voted for a conservative party - and the because certain social factors tend to lean people to being either liberal or conservative, these different electorates lived in different states and different social circumstances. A house divided.

To my bored British eyes this looks exciting - politics matters, the party base's are mobilised in opposition to the hated other, turnout is up (17 million more people voted in 2004 than in 2000 - Kerry lost on millions more votes than Gore 'won') - its exciting. Compare Bush's 2004 electoral strategy (mobilise the base, half the country hates me so I just need to get 51%) to Cameron's (blurr the differences in policy, emphasise the style over the substance). It's not meet in the middle - its raise the stakes - it couldn't be more different.

So I end up feeling rather ambiguous about Brownstein's conclusions - which are that polarisation and hyper-partisanship (especially with divided government) is preventing America from dealing with the big issues because Democrats and Republicans are unwilling to work together on health care, foreign policy, climate change. He looks to Arnie's California or some achievements of the Clinton period as a better way forward - where the emphasis was on both sides compromising to get results.

He is right of course that leaders need to reach out, especially in a presidential system with the risk of an opposing congress - Clinton failed on health care precisely because his tent (on that issue) wasn't big enough. Where he did build a bigger tent, he got legislative results (balancing the budget, NAFTA, education). Also Democrats need to reach out more than Republicans because their base (ideological liberals) is smaller than the GOP's (ideological conservatives). So the next President (especially a Democratic president) needs to be the unifier that Bush claimed he would be in 2000 after the stolen election, but so spectacularly was not. This is the very thing Obama is of course promising - but all of the candidates give this some emphasis (there's a golden rule that the next president is almost always the personal opposite of the previous one - which given the last eight years can only be a good thing, even if its a Republican).

However, as Brownstein himself recognises, the days of bargaining were the days when many things did not get done - most fundamentally and appallingly on civil rights and de-segregation. Centrist muddling though has its costs - not just in bored electorates, but also in policies that are not ambitious enough to meet the big challenges - especially on health insurance which is such a moral disgrace in a rich nation and on climate change, the planetary imperative. Centrism did not deliver the New Deal - ambition and imagination did.

The fact that a more polarised politics has led the Democratic contenders in this election to propose more ambitious policies on the big questions than Bill Clinton in his day is unquestionably a good thing - where Brownstein is right is that they will need to seek the support of independents and moderate Republicans in implementing them, if they are to stick.

So, before Brownstein decries the state of his nation too much - I ask him to visit our's. No breakfast table debates or queues round the block to get into political meetings here. Politics should still get our pulses racing.