Well done to Parky and Kylie. Very well deserved. But what an embarassment the British honours system is. Sir Ian McKellan is to become a member of a group called the Companion of Honour - an exclusive order of only 65 members including the Queen herself. There are other obscure orders including the Most Noble Order of the Garter and the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle.
Does anyone understand what any of this means or signifies? The whole thing also stinks of outdated notions of social hierarchy. There is nothing wrong with any society, including an egalitarian one, rewarding citizens who have made a significant contribution to the community in the past year - but our current system mixes up recognition of civic contributions with ancient titles signifying social status.
So can we give public recognition to to those who have made an important contribution to the community but get rid of the nonesense? Yes - here's a seven point plan.
1. Detach honours from titles - stop giving out knighthoods, damehoods etc. Just give some letters after a persons name that would indicate they have received an award. This means we wouldn't have to embarasssingly refer to people as 'Sir Michael' or 'Dame Mary', but if someone has got an OBE they could still have it formally recognised after their name. The existing knights could keep their knighthoods but the titles would die with them.
2. Detach honours from seats in parliament - the honours system should be about rewarding civic contributions, not allocating seats in the legislature. Have a fully elected second chamber.
3. Make the system intelligible so we can all understand what a civic honour means - you could still have grades for different levels of contribution, but perhaps three or four rather than twenty odd. You could award them all on a single day.
4. Remove references to the empire and the military. The military should have their own separate system for acknowledging bravery. Many of us would refuse an honour that referred to Britain's imperialist past. Rather than celebrating colonialism, the honours system should speak to what we today value as a society. One concession to the traditionalists - you could keep the letters, so as the Public Administration Select Commitee argued, you could have the Order of British Excellence, with membership signified by OBEs and MBEs. These acronyms do have traction with the public, so it would make sense to keep them.
5. Scrap the byzantine system for awarding honours (its currently done by committees of civil servants) - have a single committee made up of a representative group of respected citizens - trade union leaders, business people, sports people etc. They would be responsible for deliberating over the candidates and explaining the rationale behind their decisions.
6. Stop giving automatic honours to particular people - eg) permanent secretaries. They should be earned not given as a right to particular classes of professionals.
7. Give greater weight to local contributions than at present - eg) more community heros, less footballers and celebrities.
Saturday, 29 December 2007
Friday, 28 December 2007
Good lives
I can strongly recommend AC Grayling's new book The Choice of Hercules - partly because, as always with Grayling, it is exceptionally well written, but mainly because of its wonderful second chapter which sets out the elements he argues are required for a good life.
Of course no life is perfect or ideal - but Grayling argues that there are certain features of a good life that can be seen as analogous to musical notes, collectively making up something which sounds harmonious:
In place of talking about ideals, therefore, one might instead talk about notes that could be sounded in a life with an aspiration to the good. I intend an analogy to musical notes, to resonances, to the key in which a life is set. What is sought is a certain effect or quality, as when an assemblage of notes sounded on an instrument produces a harmony.
So, what are these elements?
1. Meaning
Good lives are meaningful lives - ones with goals and purposes. Of course if you don't believe in a deity, as I don't, then there can be no metaphysically anchored goal to human life - the human species is after all the result of evolutionary accident. Accidents are just that - they have no purpose.
Yet we humans clearly have a psychological need to give our lives meaning. We identify ourselves with causes, we set ourselves goals in terms of our careers and personal lives - we like to achieve things. We feel deeply unhappy when we lack a sense of personal direction. The idea that our lives are ultimately aimless and pointless is one we find deeply distressing.
To live good lives, ones that have value - at least for us, and those around us - we need to set ourselves objectives and strive to achieve them.
2. Intimacy
We are social animals - we thrive on relationships with others, without which we are lonesome and consequently feel unhappy. The most important of our relationships are those that are the closest and most intimate - relationships with partners, family and friends.
3. Endeavour
Challenging oneself to achieve more - as I mentioned earlier, an easy, lazy life does not seem to be a particularly good one.
4. Truth
Being honest with oursleves and others is another important component - living in denial, in a deluded cocoon, hiding ourselves away from reality cannot be good for us over time. That's not to say the odd little white lie here or there may not be justified - sometimes a lie is meant in kindness - but one cannot live one's whole life a charade. One must orient oneself truthfully to the world and one's basic purposes.
5. Freedom
Of course we are never free from life's constraints - poverty, physical ailments, commitments to others - all of these things structure the options available to us. But a good life is one in which one thinks for oneself and chooses one's own fundamental goals. The life of a heroin addict - in which one's will is controlled by an oppressive exogenous force - is not one which inspires.
6. Beauty
Beauty in one's surroundings is a basic human need - a world that is grey, dull and ugly is not one any of us likes to live in. We love trips to the countryside or walks in the park, we like listening to music, we like nice gardens, we enjoy sunny weather, we marvel at well designed buildings. Of course these things are to some extent in the eye of the beholder (Bach or drum and bass? A hot summer's day or a bright brisk autumnal morning?) - although it has to be said that there is a remarkable degree of agreement, in general terms, on those things human beings tend to like looking at, feeling, tasting or listening to. Interestingly the distribution of good surroundings is never seen as a big political problem - the fact that some people are able to access beauty more easily than others - but given the role of aesthetics in making people happy, it arguably deserves much greater emphasis.
7. Fulfilment
This is basically living in a way that integrates all of the above, one that together makes the harmonious sound we are looking for.
Of course one crucial point here is that a good life is not entirely of one's own making - whether we are surrounded by beautiful things, whether we are free to choose our life's objectives etc. is not entirely down to us. While there is a great deal each of can do to make our own lives better - even in relatively small ways - we need a good society in order that as many people as possible are given the opportunity to lead a good life.
What kind of place that would be - to allow each of us to live well in the ways described - is of course where the politics comes in.
Of course no life is perfect or ideal - but Grayling argues that there are certain features of a good life that can be seen as analogous to musical notes, collectively making up something which sounds harmonious:
In place of talking about ideals, therefore, one might instead talk about notes that could be sounded in a life with an aspiration to the good. I intend an analogy to musical notes, to resonances, to the key in which a life is set. What is sought is a certain effect or quality, as when an assemblage of notes sounded on an instrument produces a harmony.
So, what are these elements?
1. Meaning
Good lives are meaningful lives - ones with goals and purposes. Of course if you don't believe in a deity, as I don't, then there can be no metaphysically anchored goal to human life - the human species is after all the result of evolutionary accident. Accidents are just that - they have no purpose.
Yet we humans clearly have a psychological need to give our lives meaning. We identify ourselves with causes, we set ourselves goals in terms of our careers and personal lives - we like to achieve things. We feel deeply unhappy when we lack a sense of personal direction. The idea that our lives are ultimately aimless and pointless is one we find deeply distressing.
To live good lives, ones that have value - at least for us, and those around us - we need to set ourselves objectives and strive to achieve them.
2. Intimacy
We are social animals - we thrive on relationships with others, without which we are lonesome and consequently feel unhappy. The most important of our relationships are those that are the closest and most intimate - relationships with partners, family and friends.
3. Endeavour
Challenging oneself to achieve more - as I mentioned earlier, an easy, lazy life does not seem to be a particularly good one.
4. Truth
Being honest with oursleves and others is another important component - living in denial, in a deluded cocoon, hiding ourselves away from reality cannot be good for us over time. That's not to say the odd little white lie here or there may not be justified - sometimes a lie is meant in kindness - but one cannot live one's whole life a charade. One must orient oneself truthfully to the world and one's basic purposes.
5. Freedom
Of course we are never free from life's constraints - poverty, physical ailments, commitments to others - all of these things structure the options available to us. But a good life is one in which one thinks for oneself and chooses one's own fundamental goals. The life of a heroin addict - in which one's will is controlled by an oppressive exogenous force - is not one which inspires.
6. Beauty
Beauty in one's surroundings is a basic human need - a world that is grey, dull and ugly is not one any of us likes to live in. We love trips to the countryside or walks in the park, we like listening to music, we like nice gardens, we enjoy sunny weather, we marvel at well designed buildings. Of course these things are to some extent in the eye of the beholder (Bach or drum and bass? A hot summer's day or a bright brisk autumnal morning?) - although it has to be said that there is a remarkable degree of agreement, in general terms, on those things human beings tend to like looking at, feeling, tasting or listening to. Interestingly the distribution of good surroundings is never seen as a big political problem - the fact that some people are able to access beauty more easily than others - but given the role of aesthetics in making people happy, it arguably deserves much greater emphasis.
7. Fulfilment
This is basically living in a way that integrates all of the above, one that together makes the harmonious sound we are looking for.
Of course one crucial point here is that a good life is not entirely of one's own making - whether we are surrounded by beautiful things, whether we are free to choose our life's objectives etc. is not entirely down to us. While there is a great deal each of can do to make our own lives better - even in relatively small ways - we need a good society in order that as many people as possible are given the opportunity to lead a good life.
What kind of place that would be - to allow each of us to live well in the ways described - is of course where the politics comes in.
Thursday, 27 December 2007
Predictions
It's a fool's game, but what the hell, it's fun.....
1. Elections
Ken will get re-elected as Mayor of London - Johnson is a joker and Londoners aren't stupid.
Barack Obama will win the US presidential elections.
There won't be a general election.
2. Polls
Lib Dems will continue to struggle - Clegg won't make much impact. It will be tight between the big two, as the media gets bored of attacking Brown and the spotlight switches to Cameron's credibility. He'll make one or two errors that start to change the current narrative. Brown the underdog fighting back emerges as a new theme.
The SNP will continue to do well and support for independence in Scotland will grow.
5. Glastonbury
I will declare I am not going this year because it always rains. I will be persuaded to go, will spend weeks looking at absurd long term weather forecasts saying it will be sunny and then it will rain.
1. Elections
Ken will get re-elected as Mayor of London - Johnson is a joker and Londoners aren't stupid.
Barack Obama will win the US presidential elections.
There won't be a general election.
2. Polls
Lib Dems will continue to struggle - Clegg won't make much impact. It will be tight between the big two, as the media gets bored of attacking Brown and the spotlight switches to Cameron's credibility. He'll make one or two errors that start to change the current narrative. Brown the underdog fighting back emerges as a new theme.
The SNP will continue to do well and support for independence in Scotland will grow.
3. Money
The economy will continue to grow and we will get over the worst. I am not an economist - but people in the know always bet against the economy and up until now they've been wrong, so I'm staying stubbornly positive.
4. Football
Man U will hold onto the Premiership title, followed by Arsenal, Chelsea and Liverpool in that order. Boro won't get relegated.5. Glastonbury
I will declare I am not going this year because it always rains. I will be persuaded to go, will spend weeks looking at absurd long term weather forecasts saying it will be sunny and then it will rain.
Monday, 24 December 2007
On pleasure
To what extent is the good life a pleasurable one? A life full of what we might call worldy pleasures - sex, good food, fine wine, lying on beaches as attractive co-hedonists massage your back - would quickly become unpleasurable. Epicurus, the Ancient philosopher who argued that the seeking of pleasure was life's principle virtue, was rumoured in his time (wrongly as it turns out) to have suffered from too much indulgence - becoming fat and lazy. As we know from the Christmas period, sitting around, eating and drinking, tends to to expand the waste line, damage the liver, leave one feeling like you've 'over done it'. Too much sex would doubtless become boring in its own way. We are all familiar with the notion that there can be too much of a good thing.
In fact Nietzsche thought that pain and suffering were good things - precisely because it is through striving that one ultimately gets the greatest pleasures. Again everyone will be familiar with the idea that hard endeavours, tough challenges, physical pain, can enhance the pleasure at the end of any process. We climb mountains not just because we want to see the view from the summit - but also because the climbing itself provides enjoyment - even the most difficult parts. The beauty of football, a friend of mine once pointed out, is that unlike American football, the goals are relatively rare. Cold Saturdays of scoreless draws, miserable 1-1 games, games lost in the 90th minute, make a 4-0 thrashing by one's team all the more satisfying when it comes. As a Boro fan I am familiar with this Nietzschean insight.
The constant pursuit of immediate pleasures - hedonism - would leave us unstuck. Constant adultery, taking sex whenever one can get it, would leave us lonely in old age, because no partner would tolerate it, and opportunities would eventually dry up as our bodies became wrinkly and our features sagged. We are all familiar with the idea that all night partying can only go on for so long, before one starts to get tired and yearn for a quiet night in.
However, as Anthony Grayling points out in his new book, a life lived exclusively in pursuit of virtue (as opposed to one lived in pursuit pleasure) would not add up to a good one either. Just as the hedonist comes unstuck through her constant indulgence of immediate desires, so the life of the moralist seems deeply unsatisfactory. Think of the Puritan couple in Blackadder II - sticking forks in their thighs between courses, and you will see what I mean. These miserable sorts can hardly be our role models.
So, as Grayling argues, the choice of Hercules - between the seductive siren on the one hand - and the virtuous noble life of sacrofice and pain on the other - is a false choice. A good life requires a balance of pleasure and virtue.
In fact Nietzsche thought that pain and suffering were good things - precisely because it is through striving that one ultimately gets the greatest pleasures. Again everyone will be familiar with the idea that hard endeavours, tough challenges, physical pain, can enhance the pleasure at the end of any process. We climb mountains not just because we want to see the view from the summit - but also because the climbing itself provides enjoyment - even the most difficult parts. The beauty of football, a friend of mine once pointed out, is that unlike American football, the goals are relatively rare. Cold Saturdays of scoreless draws, miserable 1-1 games, games lost in the 90th minute, make a 4-0 thrashing by one's team all the more satisfying when it comes. As a Boro fan I am familiar with this Nietzschean insight.
The constant pursuit of immediate pleasures - hedonism - would leave us unstuck. Constant adultery, taking sex whenever one can get it, would leave us lonely in old age, because no partner would tolerate it, and opportunities would eventually dry up as our bodies became wrinkly and our features sagged. We are all familiar with the idea that all night partying can only go on for so long, before one starts to get tired and yearn for a quiet night in.
However, as Anthony Grayling points out in his new book, a life lived exclusively in pursuit of virtue (as opposed to one lived in pursuit pleasure) would not add up to a good one either. Just as the hedonist comes unstuck through her constant indulgence of immediate desires, so the life of the moralist seems deeply unsatisfactory. Think of the Puritan couple in Blackadder II - sticking forks in their thighs between courses, and you will see what I mean. These miserable sorts can hardly be our role models.
So, as Grayling argues, the choice of Hercules - between the seductive siren on the one hand - and the virtuous noble life of sacrofice and pain on the other - is a false choice. A good life requires a balance of pleasure and virtue.
Saturday, 22 December 2007
Straw dogs
In ancient Chinese rituals straw dogs were used as offerings to the gods. During the ritual they were treated with the utmost reverence. When it was over and they were no longer needed they were trampled on and tossed aside: 'Heaven and earth are ruthless and treat the myriad creatures as straw dogs'. If humans disturb the balance of the Earth they will be trampled on and tossed aside.
I have belatedly read John Gray's book Straw Dogs. Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals. Having heard Gray discuss his more recent work Black Mass earlier this year I was prepared for a pessimistic read. Gray has surpassed my expectations. In the end this book is so bleak that rather than being depressing, one comes out feeling strangely exhilarated - you go through a very deep valley, but come out strangely sanguine at the other side - like a drunk at a bar who has lost his wife or his job and concludes, 'f*** e'm, it doesn't matter! Same again, Frank'.
Basically if you want a book that will threaten to undermine almost everything you think - then this is it. Where Alain De Botton gave us philosophy's consolations, Gray provides a moral and metaphysical slap in the face.
Gray's key claims are 1) that human beings, like all species, will become extinct, 2) that we are just animals like any other and should give up our delusions of grandeur (that we can master our environment, that we can behave morally or reasonably, that we are free to choose how to live) and 3) that there is no such thing as human historical progress.
Let's take each of these in turn.
1. Gaia's revenge
Gray is worth quoting on this, because you are likely to find him (and James Lovelock) as scary as I did:
The current spike in human numbers may come to an end for any number of reasons - climate change, new patterns of disease, the side effects of war, a downward spiral in the birth rate, or a mix of these and other, unknown factors. Whatever brings about its end, its an aberration:
'if the human plague is really as normal as it looks, then the collapse curve should mirror the population growth curve. This means that the bulk of the collapse will not take much more than one hundred years, and by the year 2150 the biosphere should be safely back to its pre-plague population of homo sapiens - somewhere between 0.5 and 1 billion.'
Homo rapiens is only one of very many species, and not obviously worth preserving. Later or sooner it will become extinct.When it is gone the Earth will recover. Long after the last traces of the human animal have disappeared, many of the species it is bent on destroying will still be around, along with others that have yet to spring up. The Earth will forget mankind. The play of life will go on.
Goodness gracious me. That's quite something. Of course I've always theoretically accepted the idea that eventually life on earth will come to an end - but have thought that at some point so far away as to be inconceivable, our successors will build huge inter-galactic space craft and escape exodus-like to a new home - Moses in a space suit at the helm.
But of course Gray is right - we are just a species and like others eventually its likley we'll be no more. It is this aspect of the book that leaves you feeling relatively sanguine - it puts everything into dramatic perspective. All these struggles to make history, to change the world - capitalism, communism, islamism - it will all come to naught in the end. There's something oddly liberating about that thought.
2. Human animals
Gray draws on a range of empirical evidence from history, neuro-science and psychology to show that we really are just animals in the way we think and behave - and we should give up on our illusions to immortality or any kind of special species status. This evidence leads him to a number of dramatic conclusions that he argues undermine the central concepts of Western philosophy (one of Gray's virtues is that he draws heavily on ideas from non-Western traditions such as Taoism and Buddhism which are much less anthropocentric).
So, the idea that has been passed down from Socrates to the Enlightement that human beings can access truths about the universe, through the exercise of reason, is undermined by findings from physics showing that there may be nothing at all orderly or logical about the nature of the universe. There is no essence of things that we are capable of tapping into. Like the other beings that inhabit the Earth we will never understand why we are here or free ourselves from everyday deceptions.
Gray quotes evidence undermining the idea that we are free to choose how we live - another characteristic that is said to distinguish us from apes, cats, dogs etc. He argues that we are by and large causally determined in what we do. I have no choice over some of the most important things about me - where I was born, who my parents are, what I look like. And new evidence from neuro-science shows that much of what we believe we have decided to do, is actually done before the idea of doing it enters the brain - I don't decide to put my clothes on or catch the bus in the morning, I just do it. After the fact, the memory of the decision is a comfortable illusion. The idea of the rational choosing self just doesn't correspond with how we actually live 90% of the time. Free will, for Gray, is a myth.
Science also undermines the key Enlightenment idea of selfhood - the idea that there is a coherent being that sits in our bodies and operates them like machinists operating their mechanical tools. Consciousness is fragmentary, the myth of a self that brings all our consciouss sensations and idea together, is a delusion. We also perceive a great deal without conscious awareness - as shown by the effectiveness of subliminal advertising. The human mind does not depend on conscious awareness - and Gray argues that plays only a small role in the way that we function day to day.
Gray reserves some of his most withering barbs for an all-out attack on morality and humanist ethics. There is no objective right or wrong - Socrates thought truth and goodness were equivalent, Gray disputes this. Morality is not for him especially more valuable than other valuable things - beauty for example. If we are honest with ourselves we will realise that most of what we do is not ethically deliberated over - but driven by immediate need. This is Schopenhauer's 'will to life' - to procreate, to eat etc. These natural needs will always win out in a contest with 'morality' - so lets stop deluding oursleves that we are in any way civilised.
Morality is a sickness peculiar to humans, the good life is a refinement of the virtues of animals. Arising from our animal natures, ethics needs no ground: but it runs aground in the conflict of our needs.
This leads directly to his final main point...
3. There is no such thing as human progress
History is just swings and roundabouts. Science has made advances - we have become more knowledgable - but we will never change human nature. In no way has life become better. As science has advanced so has mass murder.
Death camps are as modern as laser surgery.
More than that - it is precisely those who have attempted to bring about utopian visions of the future, who have tried to perfect human beings and transcend our natural lot - that have murdered millions in seeking to do so. Enlightenment values are not merely a fantasy - they are downright dangerous.
We only act to try to change the world because it makes us feel better. We think we are giving our lives meaning - when they have none. Human animals can't overcome their mortal fate and it is deluded to try. Stop acting - and start seeing things as they are - that is a more appropriate way of life.
How does one respond to a philosophical mugging like this? As I said above the attack on anthropocentrism is actually very liberating - acknowledging the likelihood of human extinction puts everything into exhilarating perspective. All we can do is hope it doesn't happen any time too soon and get on with living.
On ethics - I'm not convinced that Gray's animal virtues are as far as he thinks from most naturalist accounts of the basis of ethics, which I discussed in my last post. Gray argues that to act ethically is to act according to our animal natures - and I don't think this is very far from the humanist account. We have various needs and capabilities as human beings and the good life is to seek to fulfil those.
Gray claims to depart from liberal humanism in rejecting any pretence at moral universalisability - that there is any universally applicable right or wrong. But humanists don't claim objectivity. My claim would simply be that there is an extraoridnary amount of agreement on what is and what is not ethically appropriate, due to the fact that we are actually very similar in the ways that really count. Moreover, it is desirable to reach agreement between us on those things. This is because we have to live together somehow- if we can reach agreement on some central components of the good way to live, is it not better to put in place such things as charters of human rights to order our lives in ways that contribute to human flourishing?
Gray makes a curious step from saying that we by and large don't live ethically - to saying that we shouldn't try to (at least in the standard sense). He might say to pursue the good life on the standard account is delusional - well, so what? - it's still better.
Finally, we come to his account of history. Of course progress isn't inevitable - we went from Greek and Roman civilisation to the Dark Ages before the Renaissance redeemed us. Also he is right that progress on some dimensions (science, technology, knowledge) has led directly to regress on others (mass murder - the twentieth century was our bloodiest during which we perfected the art of destroying our entire planet). But there has been progress in a whole range of areas of our lives over the last few hundred years that shows what can be achieved - we live longer, less people are poor, many people at least in the developed world no longer have to undertake physically crippling labour to survive. Made no ethical progress? Well slavery was abolished, democratic systems of government have spread, there have been huge strides in the liberation of women. Lighten up a bit John - things aren't that bad.
I don't think that the fact that know we can regress and we often have is any excuse for not trying to move things forward. Gray would no doubt say I am being delusional, I'm indulging myself in the consolation of action, our animalistic drives will win through in the end - maybe - but I still think we'll be better off if we try.
I have belatedly read John Gray's book Straw Dogs. Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals. Having heard Gray discuss his more recent work Black Mass earlier this year I was prepared for a pessimistic read. Gray has surpassed my expectations. In the end this book is so bleak that rather than being depressing, one comes out feeling strangely exhilarated - you go through a very deep valley, but come out strangely sanguine at the other side - like a drunk at a bar who has lost his wife or his job and concludes, 'f*** e'm, it doesn't matter! Same again, Frank'.
Basically if you want a book that will threaten to undermine almost everything you think - then this is it. Where Alain De Botton gave us philosophy's consolations, Gray provides a moral and metaphysical slap in the face.
Gray's key claims are 1) that human beings, like all species, will become extinct, 2) that we are just animals like any other and should give up our delusions of grandeur (that we can master our environment, that we can behave morally or reasonably, that we are free to choose how to live) and 3) that there is no such thing as human historical progress.
Let's take each of these in turn.
1. Gaia's revenge
Gray is worth quoting on this, because you are likely to find him (and James Lovelock) as scary as I did:
The current spike in human numbers may come to an end for any number of reasons - climate change, new patterns of disease, the side effects of war, a downward spiral in the birth rate, or a mix of these and other, unknown factors. Whatever brings about its end, its an aberration:
'if the human plague is really as normal as it looks, then the collapse curve should mirror the population growth curve. This means that the bulk of the collapse will not take much more than one hundred years, and by the year 2150 the biosphere should be safely back to its pre-plague population of homo sapiens - somewhere between 0.5 and 1 billion.'
Homo rapiens is only one of very many species, and not obviously worth preserving. Later or sooner it will become extinct.When it is gone the Earth will recover. Long after the last traces of the human animal have disappeared, many of the species it is bent on destroying will still be around, along with others that have yet to spring up. The Earth will forget mankind. The play of life will go on.
Goodness gracious me. That's quite something. Of course I've always theoretically accepted the idea that eventually life on earth will come to an end - but have thought that at some point so far away as to be inconceivable, our successors will build huge inter-galactic space craft and escape exodus-like to a new home - Moses in a space suit at the helm.
But of course Gray is right - we are just a species and like others eventually its likley we'll be no more. It is this aspect of the book that leaves you feeling relatively sanguine - it puts everything into dramatic perspective. All these struggles to make history, to change the world - capitalism, communism, islamism - it will all come to naught in the end. There's something oddly liberating about that thought.
2. Human animals
Gray draws on a range of empirical evidence from history, neuro-science and psychology to show that we really are just animals in the way we think and behave - and we should give up on our illusions to immortality or any kind of special species status. This evidence leads him to a number of dramatic conclusions that he argues undermine the central concepts of Western philosophy (one of Gray's virtues is that he draws heavily on ideas from non-Western traditions such as Taoism and Buddhism which are much less anthropocentric).
So, the idea that has been passed down from Socrates to the Enlightement that human beings can access truths about the universe, through the exercise of reason, is undermined by findings from physics showing that there may be nothing at all orderly or logical about the nature of the universe. There is no essence of things that we are capable of tapping into. Like the other beings that inhabit the Earth we will never understand why we are here or free ourselves from everyday deceptions.
Gray quotes evidence undermining the idea that we are free to choose how we live - another characteristic that is said to distinguish us from apes, cats, dogs etc. He argues that we are by and large causally determined in what we do. I have no choice over some of the most important things about me - where I was born, who my parents are, what I look like. And new evidence from neuro-science shows that much of what we believe we have decided to do, is actually done before the idea of doing it enters the brain - I don't decide to put my clothes on or catch the bus in the morning, I just do it. After the fact, the memory of the decision is a comfortable illusion. The idea of the rational choosing self just doesn't correspond with how we actually live 90% of the time. Free will, for Gray, is a myth.
Science also undermines the key Enlightenment idea of selfhood - the idea that there is a coherent being that sits in our bodies and operates them like machinists operating their mechanical tools. Consciousness is fragmentary, the myth of a self that brings all our consciouss sensations and idea together, is a delusion. We also perceive a great deal without conscious awareness - as shown by the effectiveness of subliminal advertising. The human mind does not depend on conscious awareness - and Gray argues that plays only a small role in the way that we function day to day.
Gray reserves some of his most withering barbs for an all-out attack on morality and humanist ethics. There is no objective right or wrong - Socrates thought truth and goodness were equivalent, Gray disputes this. Morality is not for him especially more valuable than other valuable things - beauty for example. If we are honest with ourselves we will realise that most of what we do is not ethically deliberated over - but driven by immediate need. This is Schopenhauer's 'will to life' - to procreate, to eat etc. These natural needs will always win out in a contest with 'morality' - so lets stop deluding oursleves that we are in any way civilised.
Morality is a sickness peculiar to humans, the good life is a refinement of the virtues of animals. Arising from our animal natures, ethics needs no ground: but it runs aground in the conflict of our needs.
This leads directly to his final main point...
3. There is no such thing as human progress
History is just swings and roundabouts. Science has made advances - we have become more knowledgable - but we will never change human nature. In no way has life become better. As science has advanced so has mass murder.
Death camps are as modern as laser surgery.
More than that - it is precisely those who have attempted to bring about utopian visions of the future, who have tried to perfect human beings and transcend our natural lot - that have murdered millions in seeking to do so. Enlightenment values are not merely a fantasy - they are downright dangerous.
We only act to try to change the world because it makes us feel better. We think we are giving our lives meaning - when they have none. Human animals can't overcome their mortal fate and it is deluded to try. Stop acting - and start seeing things as they are - that is a more appropriate way of life.
How does one respond to a philosophical mugging like this? As I said above the attack on anthropocentrism is actually very liberating - acknowledging the likelihood of human extinction puts everything into exhilarating perspective. All we can do is hope it doesn't happen any time too soon and get on with living.
On ethics - I'm not convinced that Gray's animal virtues are as far as he thinks from most naturalist accounts of the basis of ethics, which I discussed in my last post. Gray argues that to act ethically is to act according to our animal natures - and I don't think this is very far from the humanist account. We have various needs and capabilities as human beings and the good life is to seek to fulfil those.
Gray claims to depart from liberal humanism in rejecting any pretence at moral universalisability - that there is any universally applicable right or wrong. But humanists don't claim objectivity. My claim would simply be that there is an extraoridnary amount of agreement on what is and what is not ethically appropriate, due to the fact that we are actually very similar in the ways that really count. Moreover, it is desirable to reach agreement between us on those things. This is because we have to live together somehow- if we can reach agreement on some central components of the good way to live, is it not better to put in place such things as charters of human rights to order our lives in ways that contribute to human flourishing?
Gray makes a curious step from saying that we by and large don't live ethically - to saying that we shouldn't try to (at least in the standard sense). He might say to pursue the good life on the standard account is delusional - well, so what? - it's still better.
Finally, we come to his account of history. Of course progress isn't inevitable - we went from Greek and Roman civilisation to the Dark Ages before the Renaissance redeemed us. Also he is right that progress on some dimensions (science, technology, knowledge) has led directly to regress on others (mass murder - the twentieth century was our bloodiest during which we perfected the art of destroying our entire planet). But there has been progress in a whole range of areas of our lives over the last few hundred years that shows what can be achieved - we live longer, less people are poor, many people at least in the developed world no longer have to undertake physically crippling labour to survive. Made no ethical progress? Well slavery was abolished, democratic systems of government have spread, there have been huge strides in the liberation of women. Lighten up a bit John - things aren't that bad.
I don't think that the fact that know we can regress and we often have is any excuse for not trying to move things forward. Gray would no doubt say I am being delusional, I'm indulging myself in the consolation of action, our animalistic drives will win through in the end - maybe - but I still think we'll be better off if we try.
Thursday, 20 December 2007
Meta-ethics
What ultimately grounds right and wrong, good or bad?
Is it God? No. As I have commented previously, religion is a particularly barren place to look when seeking out the foundations of ethical life. Religions say things like 'don't fall in love with someone of the same gender', 'don't get a divorce', 'dont have a termination' because God commands it so - and if you don't obey God you'll end up in hell. This is a morality based on fear - it is purely prudential - unless one obeys one gets punished, if one obeys one gets to spend eternity in paradise.
What a deeply unattractive doctrine - the idea that the morally justified motivation for doing the 'right thing' is simply fear of the fires of hell.
Its unattractiveness can be illustrated by a simple example: two people each save a child from drowning. When asked for their motivation in doing so one replies that he acted out of concern for the child's well-being and love of their fellow man. The other says he did it because he didn't want to be struck down by lightening or go to hell. Which best fits our basic intuitions of ethical value?
The religious moralist can't allow the first man to get away with a Godless ethics. Moral acts for him or her have to be acts which are motivated by obedience to God's will - if it is conceded that you can act rightly or wrongly from any other motivation (love of humanity for instance), then God becomes irrelevant - the deity is no longer the lynch pin of the system - and the religious basis of ethics falls.
So if God doesn't decide - who does? Indeed, in the absence of God, can we ground our ethics in anything at all? Or are we just left in a subjectivist swamp, with people being justified in saying things like, 'I think genocide is wrong, but who am I to impose my moral framework on another culture, their view is just as valid as mine'? That would be deeply unsatisfactory.
For me a humanist ethics is the only plausible alternative. We need something that is based in an understanding of the kind of people we human beings are. Ultimately there are certain characteristics of human beings that make it good for us to behave in certain sorts of ways and bad for us to behave in certain other sorts of ways. What is right or wrong is not utterly relative - it is grounded in the kind of animals we are, in an understanding of our very basic needs and capabilities.
Goodness is not the diktat of some imagined supreme being - rather, to be good is to act in a way that allows humans beings to flourish. The good life and the rightness or wrongness of our acts is something which we can determine by looking at our essential natures as human beings - we are social animals, we need loving relationships, we have a capacity for independent rational thought, we need to eat, we are at our best whem we are free from exploitation and bondage etc.
All this leads us to the question of what a good life or a good society looks like - to which I will return.
Is it God? No. As I have commented previously, religion is a particularly barren place to look when seeking out the foundations of ethical life. Religions say things like 'don't fall in love with someone of the same gender', 'don't get a divorce', 'dont have a termination' because God commands it so - and if you don't obey God you'll end up in hell. This is a morality based on fear - it is purely prudential - unless one obeys one gets punished, if one obeys one gets to spend eternity in paradise.
What a deeply unattractive doctrine - the idea that the morally justified motivation for doing the 'right thing' is simply fear of the fires of hell.
Its unattractiveness can be illustrated by a simple example: two people each save a child from drowning. When asked for their motivation in doing so one replies that he acted out of concern for the child's well-being and love of their fellow man. The other says he did it because he didn't want to be struck down by lightening or go to hell. Which best fits our basic intuitions of ethical value?
The religious moralist can't allow the first man to get away with a Godless ethics. Moral acts for him or her have to be acts which are motivated by obedience to God's will - if it is conceded that you can act rightly or wrongly from any other motivation (love of humanity for instance), then God becomes irrelevant - the deity is no longer the lynch pin of the system - and the religious basis of ethics falls.
So if God doesn't decide - who does? Indeed, in the absence of God, can we ground our ethics in anything at all? Or are we just left in a subjectivist swamp, with people being justified in saying things like, 'I think genocide is wrong, but who am I to impose my moral framework on another culture, their view is just as valid as mine'? That would be deeply unsatisfactory.
For me a humanist ethics is the only plausible alternative. We need something that is based in an understanding of the kind of people we human beings are. Ultimately there are certain characteristics of human beings that make it good for us to behave in certain sorts of ways and bad for us to behave in certain other sorts of ways. What is right or wrong is not utterly relative - it is grounded in the kind of animals we are, in an understanding of our very basic needs and capabilities.
Goodness is not the diktat of some imagined supreme being - rather, to be good is to act in a way that allows humans beings to flourish. The good life and the rightness or wrongness of our acts is something which we can determine by looking at our essential natures as human beings - we are social animals, we need loving relationships, we have a capacity for independent rational thought, we need to eat, we are at our best whem we are free from exploitation and bondage etc.
All this leads us to the question of what a good life or a good society looks like - to which I will return.
Wednesday, 19 December 2007
Nerds in town
I am in Thailand at the moment, travelling about a bit. What has struck me since getting here is the way that cheap air travel has led to an explosion in sexual exploitation. Here the number of old fat white men walking hand in hand with young attractive Thai women is incredible - it makes me wince every time I see it, which is all the time. When I see an old white European man holding hands with someone, I pray its an old white European woman - but more often than not, its not. You see guys that in Britain one would guess are not at the front of the queue in the pulling stakes, walking around with very attractive women on their arms.
I keep telling myself 'maybe they really like them', but if they do then our notions of physical attractiveness really are a lot more relative than I thought. These girls are being exploited for sex - there can be no other plausible reason for them hanging around with a fat English or German bloke twice their age.
When I lived in Cuba I once met a group of British trainspotters - and yes they were the nerdy type - who had come to look at the old Victorian steam engines still running on the country's railways - but who also as it transpired came to pull women - something they were much more successful at in Cuba than back home. Again this is unlikley to be due to Cuban women having remarkably different preferences when it comes to men.
I must stress I am not a prude when it comes to sex or even promiscuity particularly - sex is a natural and pleasurable thing and if people want to have lots of sex on holiday, no problem. But it's the inequality in power that makes these liaisons problematic.
So here is the miserable face of our unequal world - at its seediest. Girls who if they were given a free choice would not be spending their time with these guys - and who are, by the look of it, spending most of their evenings with guys they probably aren't physically attracted to. And these guys who due to age or nerdiness or whatever are likely to be at the back of the queue when it comes to finding a sexual partner at home, coming out here so that for their first time in their lives, they are the ones that get the good looking girl. Every way you look at it - its a miserable, miserable state of affairs.
I keep telling myself 'maybe they really like them', but if they do then our notions of physical attractiveness really are a lot more relative than I thought. These girls are being exploited for sex - there can be no other plausible reason for them hanging around with a fat English or German bloke twice their age.
When I lived in Cuba I once met a group of British trainspotters - and yes they were the nerdy type - who had come to look at the old Victorian steam engines still running on the country's railways - but who also as it transpired came to pull women - something they were much more successful at in Cuba than back home. Again this is unlikley to be due to Cuban women having remarkably different preferences when it comes to men.
I must stress I am not a prude when it comes to sex or even promiscuity particularly - sex is a natural and pleasurable thing and if people want to have lots of sex on holiday, no problem. But it's the inequality in power that makes these liaisons problematic.
So here is the miserable face of our unequal world - at its seediest. Girls who if they were given a free choice would not be spending their time with these guys - and who are, by the look of it, spending most of their evenings with guys they probably aren't physically attracted to. And these guys who due to age or nerdiness or whatever are likely to be at the back of the queue when it comes to finding a sexual partner at home, coming out here so that for their first time in their lives, they are the ones that get the good looking girl. Every way you look at it - its a miserable, miserable state of affairs.
Cleggtastic!
I'm pleased that the Lib Dems voted for Nick Clegg. There are two reasons for this. First, from Labour's point of view, it is better to have a Lib Dem leader whose focus is on fighting Cameron in the South, rather than on picking fights with Labour for left-leaning voters. Part of the reason for Cameron's decent poll ratings lies in the collapse of the Lib Dem vote, with middle class centrists liking the look of a less chauvanistic, less rabidly right-wing conservatism. Clegg is the best candidate to win these well-healed moderates back. So, Clegg's victory is bad for the Tories, good for Labour and good for the Lib Dems themselves, because as wise commentators keep reminding their activists, most of their seats are won in direct competition with the Conservatives, not Labour.
The second reason is not in the slightest bit strategic - but more a matter of personal taste. I met Nick Clegg once and he seems like a genuinely nice (and intellectually curious) guy. Chris Huhne on the other hand seems to embody all those characteristics of libdemmery that we Labour activists despise. These include a smug sanctimoniousness sitting irritatingly alongside a cheap opportunistic populism. People said there was no difference between them - but for me they are the Lib Dem's ying and yang, together summing up the third party's Janus face. Clegg is the plausible lib dem nice guy who you can do business with, in the mould of Paddy Ashdown or Ming Campbell, whereas Huhne is the nasty little man holed up in his backroom designing duplicitous bar charts. I am glad the better side of the Lib Dem soul came through.
The second reason is not in the slightest bit strategic - but more a matter of personal taste. I met Nick Clegg once and he seems like a genuinely nice (and intellectually curious) guy. Chris Huhne on the other hand seems to embody all those characteristics of libdemmery that we Labour activists despise. These include a smug sanctimoniousness sitting irritatingly alongside a cheap opportunistic populism. People said there was no difference between them - but for me they are the Lib Dem's ying and yang, together summing up the third party's Janus face. Clegg is the plausible lib dem nice guy who you can do business with, in the mould of Paddy Ashdown or Ming Campbell, whereas Huhne is the nasty little man holed up in his backroom designing duplicitous bar charts. I am glad the better side of the Lib Dem soul came through.
Friday, 7 December 2007
Chávez - a reprise
Don Paskini points out that my Chávez post got some attention over at Liberal Conspiracy.
Just two points in response to Aaron: first, I don't think the world is black and white, but I do think that at times of major social or political struggle between clearly identifiable forces of left and right, people on the left should show solidarity with comrades in other countries. This is not the same thing as saying we should support all regimes that are enemies of the United States. The Iranian regime is not a left-wing government.
Second, I don't think Chávez is 'just a radical democrat'. What he is is rather mysterious. When he first got elected in 1998 I was completely bemused as to why the Venezuelan 'middle class' (or maybe it would be better just to call them 'the rich') hated him so much. He favoured a mixed economy, admired Tony Blair, seemed pretty middle of the road in terms of economic policy. Richard Gott claims that racism has a lot to do with it. Their opposition is easier to understand today - it is clear that he is now intent on a genuinely radical redistributive project. So he's not just a radical democrat - but he's not Fidel Castro either. He has committed himself to changing Venezuela within the constitutional rules of the game, socialism through democracy. And I wish him luck.
Just two points in response to Aaron: first, I don't think the world is black and white, but I do think that at times of major social or political struggle between clearly identifiable forces of left and right, people on the left should show solidarity with comrades in other countries. This is not the same thing as saying we should support all regimes that are enemies of the United States. The Iranian regime is not a left-wing government.
Second, I don't think Chávez is 'just a radical democrat'. What he is is rather mysterious. When he first got elected in 1998 I was completely bemused as to why the Venezuelan 'middle class' (or maybe it would be better just to call them 'the rich') hated him so much. He favoured a mixed economy, admired Tony Blair, seemed pretty middle of the road in terms of economic policy. Richard Gott claims that racism has a lot to do with it. Their opposition is easier to understand today - it is clear that he is now intent on a genuinely radical redistributive project. So he's not just a radical democrat - but he's not Fidel Castro either. He has committed himself to changing Venezuela within the constitutional rules of the game, socialism through democracy. And I wish him luck.
At the hairdressers
I enjoy getting my hair cut these days. It wasn't always thus. When I was a kid Dave the local barber only did one style - and I always thought my hair looked worse coming out than it did going in. I was also a shy kid and didn't really enjoy the sort of compulsory banter.
Now I pay ten times that - in a salon - and you don't get a hair dresser, you get a stylist. My stylist is a lovely girl called Eve from New Zealand - we talk about clubs we've been to, where we're going on holiday, what our girlfriends/boyfriends are like. It's nice.
And she cuts my hair. No really. Properly with scissors - real close. I never realised that this was what a proper hair cut was like - no number twos or threes around the sides, but scissors carefully run over your head. And your hair actually looks good when you leave.
I think it's worth twenty eight pounds. It lasts for an hour - it's normally a Saturday, I'm feeling slightly hung over and I'm in need of tea and sympathy. And you get it - tea - or proper coffee. You can read The Guardian - I always read the sports section to make me feel like a man, because I know really that as a bloke I shouldn't be enjoying this - I should want to get my haircut by a fat bloke with tatoos who learnt how to use shears in the army. The least I can do is read the sports section.
You also get a head massage - attractive girls shampoo and condition your hair and then massage your head for five minutes. I would pay ten pounds for that in and of itself - especially when feeling worse for wear on a rainy Saturday in North London.
The whole place feels great - the ambience of cool chat. The soundtrack is always kind of chilled deep house - last time I felt like getting up and having a dance, though often I just want to go to sleep.
And they wash your hair after they've cut it - so you don't have to walk around with loose hair in your ears. That's worth another five pounds.
Of course they cut your hair not too short - so you have to go back again in a month's time. But I don't mind, I want to go back.
Now I pay ten times that - in a salon - and you don't get a hair dresser, you get a stylist. My stylist is a lovely girl called Eve from New Zealand - we talk about clubs we've been to, where we're going on holiday, what our girlfriends/boyfriends are like. It's nice.
And she cuts my hair. No really. Properly with scissors - real close. I never realised that this was what a proper hair cut was like - no number twos or threes around the sides, but scissors carefully run over your head. And your hair actually looks good when you leave.
I think it's worth twenty eight pounds. It lasts for an hour - it's normally a Saturday, I'm feeling slightly hung over and I'm in need of tea and sympathy. And you get it - tea - or proper coffee. You can read The Guardian - I always read the sports section to make me feel like a man, because I know really that as a bloke I shouldn't be enjoying this - I should want to get my haircut by a fat bloke with tatoos who learnt how to use shears in the army. The least I can do is read the sports section.
You also get a head massage - attractive girls shampoo and condition your hair and then massage your head for five minutes. I would pay ten pounds for that in and of itself - especially when feeling worse for wear on a rainy Saturday in North London.
The whole place feels great - the ambience of cool chat. The soundtrack is always kind of chilled deep house - last time I felt like getting up and having a dance, though often I just want to go to sleep.
And they wash your hair after they've cut it - so you don't have to walk around with loose hair in your ears. That's worth another five pounds.
Of course they cut your hair not too short - so you have to go back again in a month's time. But I don't mind, I want to go back.
Clubbing, the Queen and darts
Liam Byrne has set out what he believes to be the essence of Britishness:
You get a sense of what people hold dear by asking about what we would miss if they left. The NHS is mentioned over and over again. So is the monarchy. So are our values of tolerance and fairness, of a healthy disrespect for authority yet a keen sense of order. And so are the little things that sometimes mean everything; a cup of tea, pubs, cider, the BBC, queuing, proper chocolate, fish and chips, darts, fashion, the seasons and countryside, walks and clubbing.
Echos of John Major and old maids bicycling to holy communion through the morning mist? Well, a Cool Britannia version I guess - Major didn't mention clubbing or fashion.
He's right about darts though -maybe they could show episodes from Bullseye at the citizenship ceremonies? 'You can't beat a bit o'Bully. That's Jim Bowen - and the fat man with the reassuring voice is Tony Green. Each team has a person thats good at darts and a clever person who can't play for toffee. If they gamble and lose, they get their bus fare home. If they win, they get Bully's star prize - generally a speed boat. Useful in Nottingham. What's that thing? Its a soda stream - in the 1980s no British home was without one.'
You get a sense of what people hold dear by asking about what we would miss if they left. The NHS is mentioned over and over again. So is the monarchy. So are our values of tolerance and fairness, of a healthy disrespect for authority yet a keen sense of order. And so are the little things that sometimes mean everything; a cup of tea, pubs, cider, the BBC, queuing, proper chocolate, fish and chips, darts, fashion, the seasons and countryside, walks and clubbing.
Echos of John Major and old maids bicycling to holy communion through the morning mist? Well, a Cool Britannia version I guess - Major didn't mention clubbing or fashion.
He's right about darts though -maybe they could show episodes from Bullseye at the citizenship ceremonies? 'You can't beat a bit o'Bully. That's Jim Bowen - and the fat man with the reassuring voice is Tony Green. Each team has a person thats good at darts and a clever person who can't play for toffee. If they gamble and lose, they get their bus fare home. If they win, they get Bully's star prize - generally a speed boat. Useful in Nottingham. What's that thing? Its a soda stream - in the 1980s no British home was without one.'
Tuesday, 4 December 2007
The revolution curtailed?
For the first time since being elected in 1998, Venezuela's left-wing President Hugo Chavez has been defeated in a popular vote.
Now I declare an interest from the outset. I support Hugo Chavez. I do so not because I agree with everything he says, or his personalist style of politics - because I don't. I support the chavista process because it is a genuine and radical effort to achieve social justice and a popular model of democracy in a society denied either of those things for too long. Now of course some on the left say that because of this issue or that they can't support the Chavez process - they point to issues around militarisation, the cult of personality, a growing centralisation of power. But I just think that in this world you are either on one side or the other - I've never had much time for people who sit scrutinising their navels as history gets made around them by braver, more committed sorts. This is why, in a sort of non-acrimonious way, I just lack any basic sense of political respect for the Liberal Democrats. This is why I think people who voted for Ralph Nader in the 2000 presidential election were just daft. When the chips are down, you have to pick sides, its left versus right, rich versus poor, in this case - oligarchs and Washington versus Hugo Chavez.
So I'm with Chavez.
What does his defeat on Sunday mean for the Bolivarian project? The interesting thing about Chavez's process is that it has always attempted to run together the rhetoric of revolution, with the logic of democracy. That's not entirely new - to some extent the same was tried, unsuccessfully, in the case of Allende's Chile. This dual representation of the process throws up tensions - revolutions are dramatic, violent upheavals - they are in some essential sense authoritarian - it is about forcing the pace of change and crushing opposition to it. That's not an argument against incidentally - in some historical circumstances (usually under conditions of absolutism and dictatorship of some kind in which reformist channels are closed down) that is what popular rule and justice requires.
But in the case of Chavez he has committed himself to a revolution through democracy, it's Fidel with referenda. Whether what is going on can be called a revolution in that case is of course open to question - it is much better conceived as a process of radical reform within the constitutional rules of the game. If anything the rhetoric of revolution (with implications of winners and losers, high stakes, violent outcomes, authoritarian processes) has only helped to polarise the situation more than is necessary by frightening a good too many horses.
And of course now we have a revolution being curtailed by a popular brake - unprecedented in the history of such things, manifesting in a very powerful political way the dilemmas and constraints that this process must live with, by its very design. Ironically of course in some ways this is helpful for Chavez because it at last puts an end to the slur from his enemies in Caracas and Washington that this will all end in dictatorship. The government asked the people what it thought, they said no, the government has to think again. This is what it's all about.
The reason some accuse Chavez of being authoritarian is because they see democracy in a sort of Thomas Jefferson checks and balances sort of way - they don't like the dominance of executive and legislature by one party, they oppose any reduction in the power of the judiciary etc etc. It's true the Chavez model is not a Jefforsonian one - politics by horizontal negotiation, veto points that mean decision-making is slow and difficult, often to stop majorities getting their way. There is much to be said for this anti-majoritarian impulse.
But thats not the only model of democracy - there is another which is basically a popular rule model, government by the elected majority, accompanied in Venezuela to an unprecedented degree by government by plebiscite. This model is democractic too - its just a different kind of democracy, one which also has its appeals. What the defeat on Sunday showed was that, contrary to what its critics have claimed, this model too has some checks and balances - the check is the majority, that can constrain the president, force him to re-think.
In doing so, I think this defeat may do the Bolivarian revolution a world of good.
Now I declare an interest from the outset. I support Hugo Chavez. I do so not because I agree with everything he says, or his personalist style of politics - because I don't. I support the chavista process because it is a genuine and radical effort to achieve social justice and a popular model of democracy in a society denied either of those things for too long. Now of course some on the left say that because of this issue or that they can't support the Chavez process - they point to issues around militarisation, the cult of personality, a growing centralisation of power. But I just think that in this world you are either on one side or the other - I've never had much time for people who sit scrutinising their navels as history gets made around them by braver, more committed sorts. This is why, in a sort of non-acrimonious way, I just lack any basic sense of political respect for the Liberal Democrats. This is why I think people who voted for Ralph Nader in the 2000 presidential election were just daft. When the chips are down, you have to pick sides, its left versus right, rich versus poor, in this case - oligarchs and Washington versus Hugo Chavez.
So I'm with Chavez.
What does his defeat on Sunday mean for the Bolivarian project? The interesting thing about Chavez's process is that it has always attempted to run together the rhetoric of revolution, with the logic of democracy. That's not entirely new - to some extent the same was tried, unsuccessfully, in the case of Allende's Chile. This dual representation of the process throws up tensions - revolutions are dramatic, violent upheavals - they are in some essential sense authoritarian - it is about forcing the pace of change and crushing opposition to it. That's not an argument against incidentally - in some historical circumstances (usually under conditions of absolutism and dictatorship of some kind in which reformist channels are closed down) that is what popular rule and justice requires.
But in the case of Chavez he has committed himself to a revolution through democracy, it's Fidel with referenda. Whether what is going on can be called a revolution in that case is of course open to question - it is much better conceived as a process of radical reform within the constitutional rules of the game. If anything the rhetoric of revolution (with implications of winners and losers, high stakes, violent outcomes, authoritarian processes) has only helped to polarise the situation more than is necessary by frightening a good too many horses.
And of course now we have a revolution being curtailed by a popular brake - unprecedented in the history of such things, manifesting in a very powerful political way the dilemmas and constraints that this process must live with, by its very design. Ironically of course in some ways this is helpful for Chavez because it at last puts an end to the slur from his enemies in Caracas and Washington that this will all end in dictatorship. The government asked the people what it thought, they said no, the government has to think again. This is what it's all about.
The reason some accuse Chavez of being authoritarian is because they see democracy in a sort of Thomas Jefferson checks and balances sort of way - they don't like the dominance of executive and legislature by one party, they oppose any reduction in the power of the judiciary etc etc. It's true the Chavez model is not a Jefforsonian one - politics by horizontal negotiation, veto points that mean decision-making is slow and difficult, often to stop majorities getting their way. There is much to be said for this anti-majoritarian impulse.
But thats not the only model of democracy - there is another which is basically a popular rule model, government by the elected majority, accompanied in Venezuela to an unprecedented degree by government by plebiscite. This model is democractic too - its just a different kind of democracy, one which also has its appeals. What the defeat on Sunday showed was that, contrary to what its critics have claimed, this model too has some checks and balances - the check is the majority, that can constrain the president, force him to re-think.
In doing so, I think this defeat may do the Bolivarian revolution a world of good.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
